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Richard A. Epstein† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Externalities of all sorts and descriptions are a fixed feature 
of all real estate development in advanced societies, for much of 
the value of owning and using land derives from the simple fact 
that everyone has neighbors.1 But having neighbors is a two-
edged sword, as they are welcomed on some occasions and 
scorned on others. To deal with inevitable appearance of neigh-
bors, legal systems have developed a wide range of land-use con-
trol devices that have worked their way into the fabric of modern 
law.2 Thus modern legal systems contain techniques to regulate 
the use of land, such as private restrictive covenants and ease-
ments on the one side and elaborate local zoning codes and re-
gional growth-control regimes on the other. These same legal 
systems often develop devices from rent control to affordable 
housing regimes to regulate the price at which real estate can be 
sold or rented.3 
The use of these various devices has long been a source of 
intellectual disagreement and institutional conflict. What is 
needed in many cases is a single mode of analysis that tries to 
 
†  Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of 
Law; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James 
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, 
University of Chicago. I would like to thank Philip Cooper, University of Chi-
cago Law School, Class of 2017, and Bijan Aboutarabi and John Tienken, Uni-
versity of Chicago, Class of 2018, for their usual excellent and thorough research 
assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Richard A. Epstein. 
 1. Stephen Malpezzi, Affordable Housing: Supply Side Innovation?, RUT-
GERS CTR. FOR REAL EST.: BLOG•RE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://rutgersrealestate 
.com/blog-re/affordable-housing-supply-side-innovation. 
 2. See generally id. (listing a wide range of land-use control devices that 
are used in the modern law). 
 3. Id. 
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figure out which of these systems should be welcomed for the 
improvements that they generate and which should be con-
demned for the discord they sow. 
In order to achieve that goal, it is necessary to identify which 
real estate innovations from behind a veil of ignorance generate 
overall social improvements and which tend to result in redis-
tributive struggles that tend to undermine both political stabil-
ity and economic growth. In order to achieve that end, it is nec-
essary to take a systematic look at the various devices that are 
used to identify and control both the negative and positive exter-
nalities in real estate markets. 
This Article take up that challenge by examining the exist-
ence and control of negative and positive externalities in real es-
tate markets from a comparative perspective, with special em-
phasis on English and American law. These externalities are 
present everywhere but assume their greatest importance in re-
gions with high population densities,4 where high land values 
make it essential to allow multiple claimants to create overlap-
ping interests in the same parcel of real estate.5 But how should 
these common interests be coordinated? One approach is top 
down, where centralized state authorities make the allocative 
decisions. The alternative approach is decentralized. The state 
simply sets and enforces boundaries between strangers, and 
then it lets multiple parties decide privately whether to pool or 
to separate their activities. The first approach is marked by no-
ble ambition and backed by claims of dispassionate expertise. 
Yet the results are usually disappointing. It is much easier for 
governments to keep people apart than to bring them together. 
As a rule, voluntary arrangements tend to work better than zon-
ing laws or other compulsory land-use arrangements. 
In order to explain and defend this thesis, I shall proceed as 
follows. Part I examines the various meanings of the term exter-
nality as it is used in law and economics. Part II then launches 
a conceptual attack on the externality problem by examining the 
idealized conditions in which it cannot exist—namely those in 
which all persons obtain their full bundle of rights and obliga-
tions from a single owner, so that they wholly consent to the full 
 
 4. See generally JOHN P. BLAIR, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ANALY-
SIS AND PRACTICE 30 (1995) (stating the “externality problem increases rapidly 
as urban density increases”). 
 5. See, e.g., GOH Yihan, Tort Law in the Face of Land Scarcity in Singa-
pore, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 340 (2009) (discussing the effects of high 
population densities and land value on legal property rights in Singapore). 
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package of benefits and burdens they receive. In these settings, 
any controls over both positive and negative externalities follow 
identical paths, given that the owner has every incentive to max-
imize total revenues from his project, which necessarily requires 
the minimization of future negative externalities and allowing, 
but not requiring, the creation of future positive ones. Part III 
then explores the differing treatments of positive and negative 
externalities when neighboring landowners do not acquire prop-
erty from a single owner. It explains why it is both easier and 
more critical to control negative externalities than to create pos-
itive ones. It also rejects the provocative proposal of Professor 
Ariel Porat to recognize a private-restitution remedy for unre-
quested benefits.6 Part IV then illustrates the perils of moving 
from the decentralized private law models generated by the sin-
gle ownership paradigm to various forms of public intervention 
in land-use settings, such as zoning laws and affordable-housing 
mandates. The contrast is clear. The private models do not allow 
for redistributive objectives to weaken productive decisions. The 
public models, which operate over a far greater scope, neces-
sarily use coercive power to enforce both land-use regulations 
and transfer payments. These interventions are far more vulner-
able to political influences, especially when their exercise is not 
hedged in by a requirement to compensate parties who have suf-
fered disproportionate losses of their property rights. 
I.  EXTERNALITIES, BROAD AND NARROW   
In its broadest formulation, an externality covers any im-
pact that one party’s activities have on the welfare of another 
party.7 In a normal situation we measure externalities by their 
effects on other human beings. But often those individuals or-
ganize themselves into groups, be they commercial arrange-
ments or social organizations. It is therefore often sensible to 
short-circuit the analysis of each person’s individual position by 
treating the legal entity as a stand-in for the individual members 
whose fortunes have been altered by the activities of another 
person. The relevant impacts can be positive or negative, and 
 
 6. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 7. THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 1 (Steven A. 
Y. Lin ed., 1976) (“Generally, effects on persons not directly privy to the decision 
leading to an activity are termed externalities . . . .”). 
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refer not just to real estate transactions, but to all human af-
fairs.8 Under that definition, all actions by all persons and firms, 
however innocuous, necessarily generate both sorts of externali-
ties, often to different people. Taken seriously, this definition im-
plies that private markets will inevitably fail because they can-
not, in Professor Harold Demsetz’s famous phrase, “internalize 
the externalit[ies]”9 of human action. Government regulation, 
which generates its own positive and negative externalities, can 
never be categorically ruled out.10 Thus the system of state con-
trol snowballs, under the same broad definition, creating mas-
sive externalities, positive or negative, of its own.11 
Clearly something is amiss in this grand formulation that 
uses a definition of externality that, whatever its intuitive ap-
peal, is too broad for legal or policy work. Any serious examina-
tion of the externality problem thus starts by narrowing the class 
of externalities for which legal intervention is justified, that is, 
to what traditional lawyers called cognizable or actionable 
harms. The folly, moreover, of any broad definition is that it 
treats any refusal to deal in a competitive market as a negative 
externality, which would mean that any action that leaves any-
one else worse off may count as an actionable harm that justifies 
government intervention.12 On this expansive view of the world, 
A cannot marry B because of the disappointment of C, a rival 
suitor. But if the situation were reversed, C’s successful court-
ship could be blocked by B. Under this definition, there are al-
ways overlapping and crippling externalities. Disappointed suit-
ors in competitive markets can always complain of losing one 
sale to a rival at which all sales are suspect. The correct view, 
therefore, declines to provide compensation for all competitive 
losses. 
 
 8. See Externality, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ 
externality.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (“An externality is a consequence of 
an economic activity experienced by unrelated third parties; it can be either 
positive or negative.”). 
 9. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 357 (1967). 
 10. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local 
Governments and the Takings Clause, 181 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1689–97 (2006) 
(discussing cascading, intergovernmental externalities). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923), for the most famous development of 
this concept. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Hayek’s Constitution of 
Liberty—A Guarded Retrospective, 30 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 415, 424–26 
(2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11138-016-0367-7. 
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Economic losses, however, need to be taken into account for 
common carriers and public utilities, whose duties to serve in a 
potential monopoly position generate a correlative duty to offer 
service at fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates.13 Note 
that these duties are not symmetrical: potential customers need 
not avail themselves of the services supplied by common carriers 
or public utilities, but are free to seek or create alternative ser-
vices to undercut the monopoly power position of the common 
carrier or public utility. More generally, the scope of this com-
mon carrier exception contracts whenever new technologies con-
vert formerly monopolistic markets into competitive ones, so 
that nondiscrimination duties are no longer needed (as is the 
case with net neutrality in the provision of telecommunications 
services).14 
The treatment of these abundant externalities arises with 
far greater urgency in real estate markets where close proximity 
among neighbors invariably gives rise to both positive and neg-
ative externalities, from either consistent or inconsistent land 
uses. Coase’s analysis of the problem of social cost anticipates 
just that problem in his discussion of Sturges v. Bridgman, 
where a physician sought to enjoin a neighboring confectioner 
from operating machinery whose vibrations interfered with the 
doctor’s examination of patients.15 That interaction had a sec-
ond, temporal dimension because the confectioner began his 
noisy operations before the physician set up his more sensitive 
practice near their party wall.16 
The law has two mechanisms for addressing these types of 
externalities. It can use legal intervention to control the negative 
externalities or to encourage the positive ones. Or it can rely on 
private ordering, whereby the parties sort themselves in ways 
that minimize the negative externalities and enhance the posi-
tive ones. The challenge is to figure out how these two systems 
work best together to encourage both efficient sorting and effec-
 
 13. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 436–38. 
 14. Cf. Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Com-
mission Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf (stating that competition decreases ne-
cessity of regulation). 
 15. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8–10 
(1960) (analyzing Sturges v. Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 (C.A.) at 853). 
 16. Sturges, 11 Ch D at 853–54; Coase, supra note 15, at 8; see also William 
F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
3–4 (1972) (discussing the first-in-time rule).  
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tive behavioral limitations, whether through centralized plan-
ning, private initiative, or collective action.17 Typically, a mixed 
solution that combines zoning and other land-use restrictions, 
and private associations offers the best results. 
At this stage in the inquiry, it is best to be agnostic as to 
both the ultimate distribution of various activities and the de-
vices used for locational and temporal sorting. But the key chal-
lenge is to explain why legal systems everywhere give far greater 
protection against negative externalities through tort, most no-
tably the law of trespass and nuisance, than they offer compen-
sation through the law of restitution for positive externalities 
that are given to someone who supplies an unrequested benefit 
to another person.18 Put otherwise, the law of trespass and nui-
sance are in general more robust than the law of restitution, 
whose application is sharply restricted to cases where a tangible 
benefit or service is supplied under conditions of necessity to 
someone who has not, and could not, have taken precautions on 
his own behalf.19 At one level, this difference presents a bit of a 
puzzle because it looks inconsistent with the famous Coasean ag-
nosticism of causation—one that does not sharply distinguish be-
tween conferring a benefit and inflicting a harm.20 
Indeed, this inability to precisely identify which of two in-
teracting parties is “responsible” for the externality has spread 
from the private law into American constitutional law, in ways 
that doubtless echo in other jurisdictions. In Miller v. Schoene, 
 
 17. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 947, 947 (1984) (“The persistent tension between private ordering and gov-
ernment regulation exists in virtually every area known to the law.”). 
 18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT § 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“There is no liability in restitution for an 
unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the circumstances of the 
transaction justify the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract.”). For 
a discussion of the limiting principles of restitution outlined in the Restatement, 
see Michael Traynor, Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory Suggestions, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 900 (2011). 
 19. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1369, 1383–88 (1994) (analyzing the categories of necessity as they per-
tain to the law of restitution); Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best 
Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1994) (describing restitution as available 
when a party unambiguously benefits and could not be said to have preferred 
another option). 
 20. See Coase, supra note 15, at 13 (“If we are to discuss the problem in 
terms of causation, both parties cause the damage. If we are to attain an opti-
mum allocation of resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should 
take the harmful effect (the nuisance) into account in deciding their course of 
action.”). 
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the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone, expressed its inability to decide whether the owner of ce-
dar trees that harbored a pest that attacked apple trees was 
causally responsible for the harm, as the harm was the product 
of the joint activities of both parties.21 If the tests for causation 
are weak, it becomes difficult in any private dispute to assign 
responsibility between the parties. Then, by extension, the same 
difficulties arise in constitutional law, where, in the mistaken 
words of Justice Antonin Scalia, “the distinction between ‘harm-
preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye 
of the beholder.”22 This supposed insight into causation is in fact 
a ruinous form of intellectual relativism that kills off general 
analysis by endlessly expanding the actionable classes of posi-
tive and negative externalities. The building that blocks the view 
of A is the same building that enhances the view of B. The bell 
which causes earsplitting sounds to C may provide sweet music 
to D. It is therefore necessary to craft workable limits on the cog-
nizable claims from both positive and negative externalities.23 
II.  THE SINGLE-OWNER PARADIGM IN THEORY   
The first conceptual step in this inquiry is to conduct, both 
theoretically and practically, an intellectual exercise that makes 
all externalities in both directions magically disappear. Start by 
imagining a single largish plot of land that has a single owner, 
and then asking how that owner will dispose of that land over 
time to multiple parties in order to maximize his own position 
through gains from trade. His initial parceling takes into ac-
count all of the downstream imperfections that arise in the defi-
nition and enforcement of rights, not only immediately, but over 
time.24 He does this because he knows full well that the initial 
sale of any particular unit is not the final transaction. The prop-
erty can be resold, mortgaged (and foreclosed), bequeathed, or 
otherwise given away, and it is necessary that all these takers, 
 
 21. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1928). For the history and an 
analysis of the case, see WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECO-
NOMICS AND POLITICS 151–57 (1995). 
 22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992). For my most 
recent criticism of this passage, see Richard A. Epstein, Missed Opportunities, 
Good Intentions: The Takings Decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, 6 BRIT. J. AM. 
LEGAL STUD. 109, 129 (2017). 
 23. For a case that rejects the noise claim for extrasensitive plaintiffs, see 
Rogers v. Elliot, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888). 
 24. For an analogy to the so-called durable monopolist, see generally 
Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972). 
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without differentiation, step into the shoes against all other 
claimants as holders of rights who are subject to reciprocal bur-
dens. The entire law of easements and covenants starts with the 
premise that at some distant point, the initial units will either 
be sold, foreclosed, or transferred by way of gift or will, so that 
some mechanism has to be put into place to ensure that the re-
lationships that work for the original buyers, will also persist for 
any subsequent transferees.25 These contingencies are routinely 
provided for, even in the absence of any precise knowledge as to 
when these events are likely to take place, for the simple reason 
that all that matters for the initial design is the certainty that 
such transfers will occur. The exact patterns of events is un-
known, which proves to make the task somewhat easier because 
people are behind a (partial) veil of ignorance. Because the prob-
lem is permanent and the exact pattern of events is always un-
knowable, the legal rules governing easements and covenants 
are of great durability.26 
The reason all externalities disappear in this paradigm is 
that all initial parties consent to the harms that they suffer, just 
as they are empowered to enjoy certain benefits.27 Subsequent 
parties are then bound and entitled so long as they receive notice 
of the terms of the arrangement, which can be effectively pro-
vided both from the chain of title and by recordation.28 This 
knowledge allows them to set a sensible price that reflects both 
their benefits and burdens. This single-owner approach also 
helps explain rights and responsibilities in other collective en-
deavors, including corporations and partnerships, and even 
charitable organizations. The dual protections of consent and no-
tice apply to all transactions at all times, and thus supply an 
effective response to the problems of externalities and sorting. 
 
 25. See generally JAMES C. SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES & MATERIALS 
641 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the development of the law of servitudes and cov-
enants running with the land). 
 26. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 426–27 (discussing the constancy of basic 
institutions of property law and attributing that constancy to the law’s ability 
to facilitate transactions in the face of uncertainty). 
 27. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MAR-
KETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 2 n.2 (2014) (noting that it is not entirely 
proper to consider externalities when all costs and benefits are captured and 
available for decisions by parties).  
 28. For a basic discussion of how notice improves marketability of land by 
permitting purchasers to make informed assessments of the burdens on a par-
cel, see Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the 
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1284 (1982). 
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Practical implementation of this approach is found in 
planned unit developments (PUDs), which in general have 
proven highly successful precisely because, over time, they learn 
to package the right mix of benefits and burdens.29 Understand-
ing the private approach offers a template for government regu-
lation in the common situation in which separate property own-
ers do not obtain their titles from a single owner. The differences 
between the private and public situation matter as well, so that 
it is only with caution that one can determine which of the stand-
ard PUD rules can work in the public sector. Further, the process 
is also dynamic, for as neighborhoods change, the same risk of 
obsolescence that takes place with covenants can happen with 
public restrictions as well, which suffer various rigidities for 
which individual variances, often hard to obtain, can offer only 
limited relief.30 It is therefore necessary to think of private asso-
ciations as a combination of charters and constitutions, which 
contain a mixture of strong vested rights and an elaborate gov-
ernance structure endowed with the power to tax and spend for 
the general welfare of the community.31 The key constraint in 
these voluntary associations is that each decision, whether col-
lective or private, should seek to obtain some Pareto improve-
ment—that is leave at least one person better off and no one 
worse off.32 
In this paradigmatic system, there is no coercive redistribu-
tion whatsoever, as all charitable activities—and there are 
 
 29. Much of the success in post–World War II development took place 
through this vehicle, including the well-known Levittown project. For an early 
discussion, see ROBERT W. BURCHELL WITH JAMES W. HUGHES, PLANNED UNIT 
DEVELOPMENT: NEW COMMUNITIES AMERICAN STYLE (1972) (exploring the im-
pact and potential of PUDs, which allow the same land tracts to be used for 
residential, commercial, and industrial purposes). For a general discussion of 
group ownership of land, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1315, 1322–44 (1993) (analyzing the costs and benefits to both individual 
and group land ownership). 
 30. For an example of the rigidities of covenants, see Western Land Co. v. 
Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624, 627 (Nev. 1972) (rejecting a changed circumstances 
claim). For an example of the difficulty of obtaining variances, see Commons v. 
Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1143 (N.J. 1980) (re-
manding denial of variance for further consideration, with the burden of proof 
placed on the applicant seeking the variance). 
 31. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 COR-
NELL L. REV. 906 (1988) (observing the transition of covenants from convey-
ances to governance devices). 
 32. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 8 (1993) (“[I]f no 
person in state A is worse off than he was in state B, and at least one person is 
better off in state A than he was in state B, then state A must be judged as 
superior to state B.”). 
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many—are left to separate organizations specifically dedicated 
to that purpose.33 Indeed, in these collective situations, the fre-
quent use of pro rata rules suggests that an even stronger con-
straint than a Pareto improvement should be satisfied—namely, 
that the gains generated by these actions track the level of initial 
investment to the greatest extent possible.34 That equalization 
condition is intended to maximize the size of the gain at each 
decisive step by eliminating the factional conflict over the divi-
sion of surplus.35 It is this simple insight that explains, for ex-
ample, why the fraction of benefits and duties assessed for each 
unit is set at the outset of a common unit development, propor-
tionate to the measure assigned in the original agreement.36 Yet 
some future interventions will necessarily have a disproportion-
ate impact—for example, one unit might be particularly im-
pacted by the installation of a drainage or ventilation system 
that enhances the value of the entire development. So, at that 
point, the same basic model addresses the use of cash or in-kind 
compensation for extraordinary losses, in order to ensure that 
these impositions do not leave any one person or minority group 
unambiguously worse off when the membership as a whole pros-
pers.37 
This sentiment is not just a principle of abstract justice, but 
one of intense practical importance. It explains why one of the 
single most influential sentences in American takings law reads, 
quite simply: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”38 The point here is 
 
 33. Id. at 8–9. 
 34. Id. at 98–103 (using six different scenarios to illustrate that pro rata 
gains and collective solutions are preferred). 
 35. Id. at 98. 
 36. For an agreement that assigns per lot, see The Reserve at Frisco LLC, 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Easements and Restrictions of The Re-
serve at Frisco, Article IV Section 5 (Sept. 9, 1997), http://www 
.thereserveatfrisco.com/documents/declarations.pdf [hereinafter Frisco Decla-
ration]. 
 37. See FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 77 (discussing the history of just com-
pensation). 
 38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The statement was 
made so that the materialmen who supplied work on U.S. naval boats did not 
have to foot the bill when these boats were shipped out to sea, thus dissolving 
the materialmen’s liens. Id. at 48–49. 
 2018] REAL ESTATE EXTERNALITIES 1503 
 
that this general proposition is not some abstract truth that ap-
plies only to public takings. If these thought experiments and 
PUD rules are correct, they embrace both present and future de-
cisions. Our Coasean experiment lets us do the conceptual work 
as if we live in a zero-transaction-cost world when we try to gain 
insights on how to organize future transactions in the high-
transactions-cost world of real estate markets.39 All rights and 
all correlative duties are thus strictly specified between any and 
all pairs of individuals (and of course larger groups) within the 
system.40 These rights are well-specified on substantive rights 
and governance structures, for both initial participants and their 
successors in title.41 
This complete contingent-state system reduces the risk of 
strategic behavior—that is, trying to guess the optimal time to 
acquire or dispose of any property interest by the simple expedi-
ent of equalizing rights between any two random pair of owners 
regardless of when they acquire their respective positions.42 The 
pricing decisions made in any given transaction therefore are 
solely responsive to changes in market value of the various prop-
erties, and remain so whether other properties are held by their 
original purchaser or some subsequent taker.43 The rules govern 
all matters of property possession, disposition, and use. Most 
critically, in this universe there is no distinction whatsoever be-
tween positive and negative externalities, given the web of con-
sent and notice that binds all present and future participants.44 
These rules are content-free. Hence, it is permissible to insist 
that future owners respect aesthetic concerns equally with those 
of health and safety in whatever proportions that the original 
 
 39. I have used this methodology before. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, 
Externalities and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. 
& ECON. 553 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein, Holdouts] (discussing the central role 
transaction costs play in organizing legal responses to many private-law prob-
lems); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servi-
tudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Notice and Freedom] 
(showing how the touch-and-concern requirement frustrates freedom of contract 
with respect to private property). 
 40. Epstein, Notice and Freedom, supra note 39, at 1365–66. 
 41. Id. 
 42. For an example of just this result, see Frisco Declaration, supra note 
36. The Frisco Declaration’s preamble holds that all parties and their successors 
are both bound and burdened by these covenants. Id. 
 43. Epstein, Holdouts, supra note 39, at 555 (explaining the Coasean idea 
that in a world of zero transaction costs, parties can “move resources to their 
highest-valued use”). 
 44. Id. at 560 (explaining how universal consent offers the best way to avoid 
externality problems). 
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single owner thinks will maximize the total value to all property 
owners. 
The ideal system must not only address matters when they 
go well, but also when they go badly. Knowing that litigation 
costs are always positive, the astute system designer is likely to 
avoid specifying unduly complex formulations of legal rights that 
reduce value by adding uncertainty in the definition and enforce-
ment of rights.45 By the same token, the first owner has only 
limited ability to predict future changes in technology and cir-
cumstances, so that vested rights in a buyer’s exclusive occupa-
tion of a designated unit are combined with a governance struc-
ture capable of dealing with problems that cannot be solved in 
advance, such as the governance of common areas or the need 
for future repairs and improvements. To make matters more 
complex, different developers are likely to target different clas-
ses of potential buyers, which means that rules ideal for one or-
ganization may not be so for another.46 Thus the degree of quiet 
and separation in a luxury PUD may be far greater than that 
required in one that is tailored to a lower income group. And the 
amenities and services that are supplied by developments dedi-
cated to senior citizens will surely differ from those offered in a 
PUD aimed toward households with young families.47 
In addition to these temporal demands, there is an insistent 
spatial dimension. What is the optimal size of a single PUD sub-
ject to common management? There is little doubt that the in-
crease in the number of parties governed by any arrangement 
can lead to greater stresses on the governance dimension, espe-
cially if the tastes of the individual members diverge on key is-
sues.48 At this point, it may make perfectly good sense to divide 
some initial single development into two separate ones, sepa-
 
 45. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
WORLD (1995) (concluding that complex legal rules hamper efficiency and 
productivity). 
 46. See generally French, supra note 28, at 1308–09 (explaining the prom-
issory undertakings must be devised to benefit subsequent owners in a common 
unit scheme). 
 47. For an example of the kinds of restrictions imposed, see Nahrstedt v. 
Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1277–78 (Cal. 1994) 
(en bank) (upholding restrictions against pets). 
 48. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Exit Rights: What the The-
ory of the Firm Says About the Conduct of Brexit Negotiations, 39 CARDOZO L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 108) (showing how divergent prefer-
ences led to the breakdown of the European Union).  
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rated by physical boundaries and governed by different organi-
zations.49 In effect, what happens is that rules governing tres-
pass and nuisance will be used to keep the two PUDs separate, 
allowing, where appropriate, more specific joint ventures limited 
to particular aspects of governance (e.g., dealing with common 
issues, such as power supply or flood protection, that could crop 
up). The point here is that the single owner has every incentive 
to properly divide management in these situations, just as a com-
plex corporation constantly considers whether it should engage 
in new acquisitions or divestments in order to better align its 
asset portfolio.50 Note that divestment should be regarded as a 
form of decentralized control that can be either repeated or re-
versed, as the case may be. 
All of these variations can arise from the initial single-owner 
position. That said, it still becomes critical to know exactly how, 
and why, these various decisions on management and separation 
are made. Indeed, the question has real urgency because, in most 
common situations, neighbors do not derive their title from a 
common owner, and hence need to articulate in the context of an 
initial unified development an ex-post set of workable boundary 
conditions, which should ideally be modeled on the partition pro-
cesses that a single owner voluntarily adopts ex ante. What 
works well in voluntary arrangements should create, in my view, 
a presumption for how the legal system should operate between 
strangers—namely any persons who obtain ownership through 
separate chains of title, which is the common case in a world in 
which first possession is the root of title for each separate parcel 
of land.51 Indeed, the same logic will apply even to cases of indi-
viduals who derive ownership by way of outright conveyances 
from a single owner with no reserved interests or conditions, who 
are generally treated as strangers, subject to rules that stress 
separation and not cooperation. 
In designing these rules, one further question is whether 
some extrinsic substantive requirement for servitudes should 
limit the freedom-of-contract approach based on consent and no-
tice. In my view, the answer to that question is no, so that the 
 
 49. See id. at 105 (discussing how flexible rules could help “relationships to 
morph from one form to another”). 
 50. See id. at 104 (explaining that in reality, partnerships that overcome 
conflicts of interests are rare). 
 51. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 
1221, 1221–22 (1979) (stating “the common and civil law . . . [contain] the prop-
osition that . . . taking possession of unowned things is the only possible way to 
acquire ownership of them”). 
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only limitations on these arrangements are those that address 
defects in the contracting process, remedying fraud, misrepre-
sentation, concealment, and nondisclosure, mistake, and inca-
pacity. In general, in real estate transactions, these issues are 
secondary because the high level of formality surrounding both 
inspection of title and examination of the physical premises prior 
to sale reduces the relevant risks.52 Land transactions contain 
multiple checkpoints against these unfair practices.53 
Yet other concerns arise. The first involves the application 
of the antitrust law to landowners that have real market power. 
The second involves the application of housing discrimination 
laws. The former tends to have only modest application to land-
use arrangements. The latter has an enormous one. I favor the 
former restriction, and tend to oppose the latter.54 But for these 
purposes, the key point is that in both cases the laws apply with 
equal force to both the original parties and to all successors in 
title. 
On the other hand, the law of covenants has tended to adopt 
a set of recondite restrictions on privity, touching and concerning 
the land, and the performance of affirmative covenants.55 But 
none of these doctrines has been allowed to block the PUD initi-
ated by a single developer.56 The requirement of privity was ig-
nored in ways that let a condominium association enforce all of 
its pertinent agreements.57 The touch-and-concern requirement 
covered all essential operations of the association; and affirma-
tive covenants were allowed to collect condominium assess-
ments.58 In principle, the law could go further. Thus the Restate-
ment (Third) of Property: Servitudes questions all of these 
 
 52. Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 128 (2014). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 63–64 (1995) (arguing that “reducing the 
level of variance in tastes among group members” complicates collective deci-
sion-making, which in turn decreases consumer satisfaction); see also Richard 
A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why 
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1291 
(2014) (concluding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has “become an 
instrument of repression”). 
 55. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 
15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (discussing restrictions on covenants). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 798 (disallowing the covenant restrictions to block a 
PUD). 
 57. Id. at 797–98. 
 58. Id. at 795–98. 
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restrictions and takes the sensible view that all rights over the 
land of another—covenants, easements, licenses, and profits of 
all sorts and descriptions—should be subject to uniform rules.59 
This is a welcome return to the Roman tradition of servitudes 
writ large, which I have long championed.60 Professor Susan 
French has long taken the position that my view ignores the 
“negative impact of servitudes on patterns of land use,” without 
exactly explaining which unacceptable externalities take place 
and why.61 Nonetheless, her final outlook, which has received 
little judicial acceptance, resembles my own. 
III.  POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE 
PRESENCE OF HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS   
It is now important to apply this theory to positive and neg-
ative externalities outside the context of PUDs created by single 
owners, who, as noted, have strong incentives to impose the right 
set of restrictions to maximize the value of all units after sale.62 
The best approach is to conduct a thought experiment, coupled 
with an examination of the various types of agreements for these 
PUDs. The correspondence between the two approaches is virtu-
ally complete. On the one side are powerful prohibitions against 
common-law nuisances, subject to some predictable variations.63 
On the other side lie a large number of affirmative obligations 
dealing with matters such as architecture and landscaping, 
which show far higher variation, usually dependent on wealth 
effects and custom.64 If it is correct to respect these features in 
voluntary transactions, then it is also correct to take a cue from 
these practices in establishing relationships between strangers. 
The resulting bottom line resembles the common law of nui-
sance, rationalized on efficiency grounds. 
Start with negative externalities. The typical PUD has no 
patience with any of the traditional large-scale nuisances rou-
tinely actionable at common law. I know of no residential or com-
mercial arrangements that allow for persons to freely emit odors 
 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.12 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2000). 
 60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 61. Susan F. French, Tradition and Innovation in the New Restatement of 
Servitudes: A Report from Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 123 (1994). 
 62. See supra Part II. 
 63. Epstein, Holdouts, supra note 39, at 573–76. 
 64. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059–60 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (illustrating that wealth and custom play a part in deciding to pre-
serve historical architecture). 
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or smells into the common areas. Yet the broad definition of nui-
sance reaches all “nontrespassory invasions” of the property of 
another that interfere with the use and enjoyment of that prop-
erty.65 The great difficulty that arises in this area is that this 
definition covers a huge number of activities that vary along two 
key dimensions: the severity of the harm and the number of peo-
ple who suffer from that harm.66 
These variances in scale and intensity of harm are of great 
conceptual importance in any closed environment, where the 
possibility of reciprocal harms from parallel behaviors is enor-
mous. In these environments, the repetition of low-level nontres-
passory invasions usually generates no legal remedy, so that 
people are allowed to talk in hallways and to play music in their 
apartments.67 But the question of intensity is never far from the 
center of the inquiry; there are often disputes as to whether cell 
phones may be used in lobbies, or when workmen can start re-
pairs in one unit that will cause some inconvenience to others.68 
Here, there is some sensitivity to changes in settings and sever-
ity: any differences with cell phone use is not matched by the 
common rules that limit heavy construction to weekday hours, 
roughly between 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM.69 The motivation behind 
these rules is to work a sensible accommodation between the 
need for improvements and the present comfort of all residents. 
The greatest noise and activity takes place during working hours 
when the disruptions are likely to be lower. But when more peo-
ple are at home during the evenings and on weekends the re-
strictions are put back into place.70 Given that these are all done 
by analysis behind a relative veil of ignorance, the regulations 
will tend to be efficient. But there will be stress on the exact lines 
 
 65. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953). 
 66. For a discussion of the movement from small numbers of persons to 
large numbers, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and 
Its Utilitarian Restraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 82–84 (1979) [hereinafter Ep-
stein, Nuisance Law]. 
 67. For the most famous expression of this live-and-let-live rule for low-
level interactions, see Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Ex.) 
(“The convenience of such a rule may be indicated by calling it a rule of give and 
take, live and let live.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Noise from Construction, CITY OF NEW YORK, http://www1.nyc 
.gov/nyc-resources/service/2090/noise-from-construction (last visited Apr. 26, 
2018) (demonstrating that New York City requires a permit be obtained for 
noise created after 6:00 PM on weekdays and on the weekend during all times). 
 69. Cf. ST. PAUL, MN, NOISE REGULATIONS tit. 28, ch. 293, § 293.07 (1987) 
(limiting construction noise between certain hours). 
 70. See, e.g., Noise from Construction, supra note 68. 
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of demarcation when and if certain individuals know that they 
are likely to make extensive renovations where others are not. 
It is critical to note that these observed patterns can easily 
be carried over to transactions among strangers.71 In this in-
stance, one huge advantage is that, in many cases, the increase 
in physical separation tends to reduce conflicts between neigh-
bors, as many nuisances, especially noise and odors, tend to rap-
idly dissipate over distance.72 Yet in the cases that do remain, 
the basic rules follow the voluntary pattern very closely, with the 
more severe offenses meriting the strongest responses. The 
usual rule is that injunctive relief is routinely allowed against 
substantial nuisances on a more or less categorical basis.73 As 
there are few cases of repetitive and accidental nuisances, dis-
putes over the basis of liability—the choice between intentional 
harms, negligence, and strict liability—are relatively subdued in 
this area.74 In some cases of enormous benefit, the actions may 
go forward. But, unlike the oversimplified model of damages ver-
sus injunctive relief developed by Professors Guido Calabresi 
and Douglas Melamed,75 the use of injunctions and damages are 
more often complements than substitutes.76 The injunctive side 
of the equation allows for conditional injunctions, bound by lev-
els and time of emissions.77 The damage side picks up the slack 
where the injunctive relief backs off. By starting with the former 
and moving cautiously to the latter, the total level of dislocations 
is far lower than moving to a corner position in which one of 
these remedies is adopted to the exclusion of the other. The exact 
 
 71. For a more complete account of these variations, see Epstein, supra note 
66, at 67. 
 72. Cf. ST. PAUL, MN, NOISE REGULATIONS tit. 28, ch. 293, § 293.06 (1987) 
(establishing that a noise violates the ordinance if it can be heard fifty feet out-
side of a building). 
 73. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? 
The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 244 (2012). 
 74. For the official statement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 75. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972) (developing a framework to deal with legal problems). 
 76. See A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orien-
tation, 100 PENN. L. REV. 320, 320 (1951) (“It is familiar law that a litigant in 
equity may ask and receive damages or other relief normally awarded in a court 
of law. The chancellor was not deterred from adjudication such ‘legal’ issues, for 
they were thought of as incidental and their disposition was necessary to the 
effective termination of the entire matter in dispute.”).  
 77. Id. at 338. 
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remedial mix is not easy to determine, but the traditional local-
ity rule in nuisance cases suggests where levels of interference 
from similar activities are reciprocal, higher levels of pollution 
are allowable, so long as the emissions are confined to a particu-
lar area.78 But for lower-level nuisances, a more universal live-
and-let-live rule takes over, so that neither damages nor injunc-
tive relief is allowed, given the freedom of action that arises from 
allowing these low-level nuisances is universally beneficial, es-
pecially since everyone saves on administrative costs.79 The pub-
lic law follows quite closely the patterns seen in PUDs, with one 
obvious difference: private parties have greater flexibility to ne-
gotiate workable comprehensive schemes than tort litigation, 
which is more difficult to fine tune. But the parallels are close. 
As will become clear later, modern state regulation often strays 
from these salutary principles. 
The question then arises as to how positive externalities are 
coordinated. In this regard, the key insight is that the level of 
variation in rules, whether by design or operation, is far greater 
here than in the harm-prevention realm. Virtually every adja-
cency has some potential to either create or undermine these 
positive interactions, and it takes a huge amount of local 
knowledge to specify such matters as, for example, the precise 
standards governing the conformity of exterior design. Of equal 
importance are the adjacencies between various units in the 
larger whole. Thus, for ordinary developments, it need not be the 
case that common facilities work best if all individuals have 
identical sets of uses and preferences. Indeed, it is perfectly com-
monplace in most buildings to have units of different sizes, but 
of the same general quality. This differentiation has the hidden 
advantage of lowering the stress on common unit facilities that 
come from peak load usage. If all persons had the same work and 
lifestyle patterns, concentrated periods of high demand could 
easily overwhelm communal resources.80 Yet on the other side of 
the issue, it may well be that having persons of similar tastes 
and income could support larger investments in common facili-
ties, knowing that tenants or owners in all groups will be willing 
to pay rent to obtain use of the common elements and fees can 
capture the various elements of value. There is no way to know 
 
 78. Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 66, at 87–89. 
 79. Id. at 84 (noting the administrative cost associated with low-level nui-
sances is high). 
 80. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
152–58 (1961). 
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a priori which effects are greatest in what setting. But the devel-
oper’s local knowledge puts him in the best position to maximize 
the cooperative surplus. 
In some cases, the adjacencies involve radically different 
uses at different levels. A walk down Broadway in New York City 
shows one dominant pattern. The ground floor is occupied by re-
tail space, for which street access is essential. The space gener-
ally goes below ground—in part because of a regulation that does 
not count that space against the Floor-Area Ratio (FAR) that 
limits volume above ground,81 and also because retail customers 
often do not need natural light. Above the retail area is often 
office space, close to street level and easily accessible. Hotel 
space may form a third layer, above which are a range of resi-
dential units, topped off perhaps by a restaurant with a pano-
ramic view. In some cases, the various activities are interrelated, 
as patrons in the hotel eat at the restaurant, as do many of the 
local residents. Such cross-fertilization is most important where 
land values are greatest, so that any zoning system that specifies 
single uses—residential, commercial and the like—in dense 
neighbors will undercut these synergies, a point noted by Jane 
Jacobs in the classic book The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities, which attacked the reign of Robert Moses for its sharp 
segregation of uses.82 
The next question, however, is whether it is possible to cap-
ture this system of private benefits through litigation similar to 
that on the nuisance side of the ledger. The answer has both the-
oretical and practical sides. On the former, it is difficult to iden-
tify how a principle maps onto the private rules developed by 
PUDs. To fill that gap, Professor Ariel Porat argues in favor of 
an “expanded duty of restitution” to fill the asserted gap in the 
current law.83 The basic assumption of the Porat thesis is that, 
“ideally,” negative and positive externalities should be subject to 
the same treatment, namely one of full internalization, so that 
injurers and benefactors alike are subject to the same set of ideal 
incentives (as happens within the PUD).84 The purpose here is 
 
 81. See N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 7, § 77-22 (2016). For a sum-
mary of the rules, see Glossary of Planning Terms, CITY OF NEW YORK, https:// 
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/glossary.page#floor (last visited Apr. 26, 
2018). 
 82. See JACOBS, supra note 80, at 131–32. 
 83. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unre-
quested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 205–09 (2009). 
 84. Id. at 190 (“Ideally, from an economic perspective, both the nega-
tive and positive effects should be internalized by those who produce them, for 
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to align incentives for the optimal creation of public goods, which 
individual people have insufficient incentive to create or main-
tain by themselves.85 There is a well-known inequality that 
drives the analysis of public goods: social benefits are greater 
than private costs, which in turn, are greater than private bene-
fits. Unless some coercive mechanism is introduced, the private 
party will only look at the last inequality so that the improve-
ment will not be made. Porat instances the failure to create a 
private park that improves amenities in the neighborhood.86 Po-
rat is aware of the many pitfalls that stand in the way of this 
expanded duty in particular cases: some activities produce both 
benefits and harms; sometimes transaction costs can exceed the 
gains from organizing the activity; sometimes the rules will in-
fringe on individual autonomy; and sometimes valuation prob-
lems will be daunting.87 
What this catalogue of particulars misses, however, is the 
systematic disabilities that doom this approach. Start with this 
simple difference: returning to our PUD framework, the re-
sponse to these externalities differs radically from case to case,88 
so that there is no set of uniform practices to serve as a template 
to evaluate the role of positive externalities in interactions 
among strangers. Porat acknowledges the risks of heterogeneity 
when some individuals are left worse off by actions that benefit 
others, to which he says his restitution duty does not apply.89 
Yet these situations are more common than is usually suspected; 
the introduction of the manufacturing plant in Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co.,90 for example, may diminish amenities to 
some while providing increased job opportunities for others. 
These cases of multiple effects are so pervasive that this one ex-
ception may well swallow the rule, even if it were possible in the-
ory to design a compensation scheme to cover all losers if the 
aggregate gains are sufficiently large. Indeed, the problem of 
heterogeneity goes further, because any set of diffuse benefits 
 
with full internalization, injurers and benefactors alike will behave effi-
ciently.”). 
 85. Id. at 226. 
 86. See id. at 191. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Compare Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275 
(Cal. 1994) (upholding restrictions against pets), with Anderson v. City of Is-
saquah, 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing denial of a building per-
mit by city development commission on aesthetic grounds). 
 89. Porat, supra note 83, at 220. 
 90. 272 U.S. 365, 380–81 (1926). 
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will be valued differently by different people—assuming that 
they know how to value them at all. After all, there are differ-
ences in location, view, and preferences that make it hard to 
treat all individual takers within any geographical region as 
though they were the same. The distribution of benefits differs 
sharply from the distribution of nuisances. The latter are rela-
tively infrequent, in part because the first person to be inconven-
ienced by noises and odors is often the party who generates 
them, which operates as an implicit (if imperfect) deterrent to 
these harms.91 
But there is no similar bit of self-constraint on the benefit 
side of the equation. Quite the opposite: there is a real risk of 
moral hazard, inviting people to gin up benefits for some large 
and undefined class of persons for which they then can claim 
compensation. The parallel behavior in nuisance cases is that of 
the eager plaintiff who puts himself into harm’s way—a risky 
strategy to say the least, and one that presupposes the existence 
of some nuisance-like behavior.92 The transaction-cost dynamics 
therefore are wholly different in the two cases, even if, as Porat 
rightly observes, the standard theory is moved to treat positive 
and negative externalities in the same fashion.93 
In addition, the remedial structure is not equal to the insti-
tutional challenge. Most critically, there is no parallel on the 
benefit side to injunctive relief that plays such a central role in 
nuisance cases. There is no way to enjoin persons from taking 
advantage of benefit for which they have made no request.94 Nor 
is there any method whereby the supposed beneficiaries could 
disclaim the benefit in advance, even if they knew where and 
when it was likely to take place. The magnitude of these reme-
dial difficulties is minimized by limiting the inquiry to the crea-
tion of a public park. But the logic of the expanded duty of resti-
tution could apply to routine activities like people landscaping 
their own properties, removing old shacks, or painting their 
 
 91. Cf. Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 66, at 100 (reasoning that a 
party who creates a traffic jam will have to take into account his own delays). 
 92. Cf. Marina Galperina, Why Russians Are Obsessed with Dash-Cams, 
JALOPNIK (Feb. 15, 2013), https://jalopnik.com/why-russians-are-obsessed-with 
-dash-cams-5918159 (describing Russian insurance fraud whereby drivers de-
liberately create traffic accidents in an effort to sue others). 
 93. See generally Porat, supra note 83 (arguing that while the law treats 
positive and negative externalities differently, they should be treated identi-
cally). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
§ 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“There is no liability in restitution for an unre-
quested benefit voluntarily conferred.”). 
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houses. The scope of the benefit cannot be traced out by watching 
physical interactions, as is the case with noises and smells. It is 
thus always difficult to figure out how wide to draw the circle of 
benefits in complex neighborhoods characterized by different 
types of land uses, because some, like nuisances, have intensely 
local effects while others, like regional growth, may have neigh-
borhood-wide effects.95 Indeed, the high frequency of these ben-
eficial interactions will likely lead to situations where changes 
in market value are attributable to the combined activities of 
multiple parties, posing general brainteasers under the law of 
joint-and-several liability. 
As the frequency of these beneficial interactions increases, 
the valuation problems become more acute and the gains from 
legal intervention necessarily diminish. This accumulation of 
difficulties matters. In some cases, where there are systematic 
benefits to be gained, it is possible to rely on informal social pres-
sures to get sloppy neighbors to bring their properties up to 
standard.96 Yet in general it would be disastrous to offer subsi-
dies to individuals to mow their own lawns or to paint their shut-
ters a nice shade of green. There will be no agreement as to 
which activities should receive that subsidy, how much they 
should be paid, who should be required to bear the brunt of the 
costs, or underwrite the public costs of administering such a sys-
tem. Still, some direct public investments (in contradistinction 
to payments to individual landowners) could work in connection 
with positive amenities like the creation of parks. Thus it is com-
mon today to allow for various tax breaks for the creation of 
preservation easements for either wildlife or historic structures, 
which uses a system of matching grants to achieve the needed 
subsidy at far lower costs.97 Occasionally, legislative or adminis-
trative standards may help fill the gap, although these schemes 
 
 95. Compare Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405 (Tenn. 
2013) (holding that amplified music concerts on a farm could constitute a nui-
sance), with Hood River Cty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (in-
terpreting a county ordinance regarding barking dogs). 
 96. See ANDREW JAY KAUFMAN, WHERE THE LAWN MOWER STOPS: THE SO-
CIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERNATIVE FRONT YARD IDEOLOGIES 3–4 (2000), 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=18351&context=rtd (ex-
plaining how informal social norms help ensure all neighbors maintain their 
lawns). 
 97. For a primer, see TECH. PRES. SERVS., NAT’L PARK SERV., EASEMENTS 
TO PROTECT HISTORIC PROPERTIES: A USEFUL HISTORIC PRESERVATION TOOL 
WITH POTENTIAL TAX BENEFITS (2010), https://www.nps.gov/tps/tax-incentives/ 
taxdocs/easements-historic-properties.pdf. 
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themselves can easily get carried away by excessive enforce-
ment.98 In the end, it may well be that in a world of imperfect 
administrative enforcement it is appropriate to provide no legal 
mechanism for the creation of certain positive externalities. This 
last discussion thus paves the way for a more synoptic overview 
of the strengths and pitfalls of various schemes for land-use reg-
ulation. 
IV.  PUBLIC LAND-USE REGULATION: ZONING AND 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES   
This analysis of housing markets generates what I have 
called in other contexts the “separability thesis.”99 The basic in-
sight is that covert wealth transfers of all sorts should not be 
allowed to cloud appropriate judgments for the efficient use of 
resources in light of the lessons learned from the single-owner 
hypothesis.100 In the current legal environment of extensive 
land-use regulation, however, political forces often seek major 
redistributive objectives, so that land-use regulation takes on 
the role of creating transfers across different groups under the 
guise of dealing with various positive and negative externali-
ties.101 The point here is not that there are no schemes of regu-
lation that serve legitimate functions, for, in principle, it is al-
ways possible that some system of land-use regulation can 
overcome coordination problems for private owners in a way that 
leaves all regulated parties better off than they were before. I 
will mention two such opportunities here. The first is a sign or-
dinance that requires all signs to be of a certain size and flush 
against their buildings. This ordinance gets rid of sign clutter 
and reduces the probability that one sign will block another from 
view. In those cases, where the ordinance improves the value of 
all properties, regulation should be welcome because it provides, 
in the form of restriction against like abuses by others, in-kind 
compensation for the loss of total freedom in mounting signs on 
property. Similarly, an ordinance that requires uniform archi-
 
 98. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 755 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1993) (reversing the denial of a building permit by a city development com-
mission based on aesthetic concerns). 
 99. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Innovation and Inequality: The Sep-
arability Thesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016) (applying the phrase to 
intellectual property). 
 100. See supra Part II. 
 101. See Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 361, 383 (2017). 
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tecture in historical districts can also pass that test, if the exte-
rior creates additional value for its owners as a tourist destina-
tion.102 When necessary, this scheme can be supplemented by a 
real estate tax abatement if the benefits generated go to parties 
outside of the regulated district. Unfortunately, most systems of 
land-use regulation do not resemble these well-tailored interven-
tions. Below are three important examples—Euclidian zon-
ing,103 affordable housing, and the Mount Laurel “fair share” 
rule104—of how matters can go awry. 
The use of zoning in American life began in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century with efforts to control a wide 
range of land-use problems dealing with high density and the 
adjacency of inconsistent land uses.105 The use of the single-
owner model indicates some of the rich complexities that arise in 
this area. All of these zoning plans seek to take into account the 
height, the placement, and the bulk of buildings and other struc-
tures, both because of the interdependences among them, and 
because of the enormous impact that buildings have on light and 
views (where the question is not whether these views are ever 
blocked, but rather the manner in which they block those 
views).106 In dealing with this issue, it would be dangerous to 
dismiss all zoning regulations that go beyond the scope of the 
nuisance law as unwise, but it is very difficult to come up with a 
metric that allows for good regulations to be sorted out from bad 
ones.  
The first zoning laws were relatively modest in their scope, 
dealing with such matters as height restrictions,107 on the one 
hand, and setback restrictions on the other.108 The court deci-
sions upholding these regimes often rested on a mixture of two 
 
 102. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1060, 1060 n.45 
(5th Cir. 1975) (upholding an ordinance intended to preserve historic buildings 
in New Orleans’ French Quarter). 
 103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 104. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 
336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975). 
 105. For a concise summary of the various issues, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON 
ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS, 57–68 (4th ed. 2013). 
 106. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379–81 (describing the zoning plan); Mount Lau-
rel I, 366 A.2d at 719–20 (describing the zoning plan); Anderson v. City of Is-
saquah, 851 P.2d 744, 746–47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (describing the zoning 
plan). 
 107. See, e.g., Welsh v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 100 (1909) (upholding building 
height restrictions in certain areas of Boston). 
 108. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (sustaining setback 
restrictions on public health and safety grounds). 
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dominant themes in takings law. The first is that there is a po-
lice-power justification for preventing disease from overcrowding 
and distress from dark areas.109 The second is that the general 
scope of the ordinance means that there are reciprocal benefits 
to all the parties subject to it.110 I will not go into the difficulties 
in these cases, which are close,111 but it is important to note that 
zoning ordinances often take on a far more corrosive position, 
and consequently survive only because of the high level of defer-
ence that, starting with Euclid,112 judges give to the legislators 
and administrators who put these laws into effect. 
Euclid is the most conspicuous illustration of this dangerous 
trend; a case in which, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
a comprehensive zoning scheme for the development of land in 
the Cleveland suburb of Euclid.113 At issue in that case was the 
zoning for a single contiguous sixty-eight-acre plot of land lo-
cated between a major thoroughfare on the one side and a rail-
road on the other.114 The applicable zoning ordinance broke this 
plot up into three horizontal bands.115 U-2 was suitable for two-
family homes, and U-3 for apartment houses.116 Finally, U-6, lo-
cated only 130 feet away from U-2, was zoned to “include plants 
for sewage disposal and for producing gas, garbage and refuse 
incineration, scrap iron, junk, scrap paper and rag storage, avi-
ation fields, cemeteries, crematories, penal and correctional in-
stitutions, insane and feeble minded institutions, storage of oil 
and gasoline (not to exceed 25,000 gallons).”117 
This zoning scheme was a recipe for land-use disaster, be-
cause it undid the benefits for land-use planning created by the 
single owner who could account for all externalities, positive or 
negative, from the development of the entire plot, which, given 
its size and access, was ideal for an integrated manufacturing 
plant. Its large size made it possible for self-imposed setbacks to 
 
 109. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1058–64 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
 110. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1982) (“[P]laintiff must show . . . that he has been denied the reciprocal benefits 
of a common zoning plan.”). 
 111. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Richard A. Epstein, Disap-
pointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed To Clean Up Takings Law 
in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151 (2017). 
 112. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 113. Id. at 397. 
 114. Id. at 379. 
 115. Id. at 380. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 381. 
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reduce any nuisance-like complications with neighbors. Why 
then introduce new unnecessary territorial divisions that create 
unwanted land-use conflicts by forcing the physical coexistence 
of incompatible uses? Indeed, the ordinance allegedly reduced 
the plot value by about seventy-five percent without generating 
any offsetting benefits to nearby neighbors.118 Yet Euclid al-
lowed the government to impose heavy disparate burdens with-
out using the compensation devices that are common for this 
purpose in PUDs.119 Freed therefore from any kind of price con-
straint, it is not surprising that the ordinance blocked all con-
struction on that plot until the property was ultimately used for 
a defense plant during World War II, disregarding the zoning 
plan.120 The signaling function of a price system is systemati-
cally ignored when government officials are given discretion to 
use regulations to transfer wealth from one party to another.121 
The larger significance of Euclid derives from two separate 
reasons. The first is that it enshrined a highly deferential ra-
tional-basis test that allowed all sorts of zoning schemes to be 
validated even when they resulted in systematic losses in land 
value in all sorts of other contexts.122 In effect, the rules permit-
ted the imposition of zoning restrictions with a conspicuous dis-
parate impact, directed chiefly toward anticompetitive ends that 
had little or nothing to do with the control of nuisances. The shift 
itself is marked by the adoption in 1961 of a much-expanded New 
York City zoning ordinance that shifted attention away from ex-
ternal effects on light and air toward the use that took place 
within the walls, which made it difficult to repurpose various 
buildings when economic conditions occurred, including the con-
version of old manufacturing facilities into artist lofts.123 Second, 
 
 118. See id. at 384 (stating that the complaint alleged the prezoning value of 
the land was $10,000 and that the postzoning value was only $2500). 
 119. Euclid denied recovery for the substantial devaluation of the property 
at issue. See id. For a state law covering PUD compensation, see Bert J. Harris, 
Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2017). 
 120. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 105, at 96. 
 121. Cf. Kim Jung-kwan, Energy Not a Political Issue, KOREA JOONGANG 
DAILY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article 
.aspx?aid=2965687 (arguing that government energy price subsidies undermine 
corporate confidence in market institutions). 
 122. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392 (describing possibilities that would satisfy 
the rational-basis test). 
 123. See Norman Marcus, New York City Zoning—1961–1991: Turning Back 
the Clock—But with an Up-to-the-Minute Social Agenda, 19 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 707, 710–11 (1992) (discussing a 1961 New York City ordinance revision 
that severely limited flexibility in updating property uses). 
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Euclid’s model of separate zones for different kinds of activities 
ignored the huge positive externalities that can come from mix-
ing different kinds of uses in the same zone.124 In this regard, 
the model of the modern multiple-use building is one example. 
Indeed, it was just this theme that Jane Jacobs hammered home 
back in 1961: single-use districts create dead zones in uses that 
multiple-use districts can fill.125 To be sure, the question is al-
ways empirical, for heavy manufacturing may well not fit in with 
various forms of residential and commercial use. But it bears 
noting that the failure of modern zoning schemes is that they 
rest on what Friedrich Hayek termed the “fatal conceit” that cen-
tral planners can move quickly and accurately to create the nec-
essary synergies and separations.126 It turns out that all too of-
ten they cannot, for the reasons that always stand in the path of 
central planning: ignorance and bias.  
The second major mistake in modern Euclidian zoning law 
is its constant effort to create some major form of wealth redis-
tribution through regulation that has a differential effect on dif-
ferent participants. As argued earlier, the use of the single-
owner theory does not seek to create redistribution between var-
ious groups but rather to ensure through competition that all 
these arrangements economize both the internalization of exter-
nalities and the creation of common public goods.127 In dealing 
with these issues, it often, but by no means always, suggests that 
individual PUDs will have a membership that best reduces con-
flicts, increases cooperation, and allows for the efficient uses of 
common spaces. This austere model does not survive well in sit-
uations where the ability to use the permit power allows the 
state to force selected groups to change the mix of residents in 
PUDs.128 Two common ways in which this can be done is through 
affordable housing mandates, often called inclusionary zoning, 
and through state mandates that local communities provide 
 
 124. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389–90 (describing the impact and legality of 
having separate zones for different kinds of activities). 
 125. See JACOBS, supra note 80, at 152–77. 
 126. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 113 (Bruce Caldwell 
ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (discussing the restrictions on speed and efficiency 
of government action when hindered by numerous considerations); F.A. HAYEK, 
THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 21 (W.W. Brantley III ed., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (stating the “fatal conceit” concept rests in the collec-
tive overconfidence in the belief “that the ability to acquire skills stems from 
reason”). 
 127. See supra Part II. 
 128. Cf. Wilson v. Borough of Mountainside, 201 A.2d 540, 541, 453 (N.J. 
1964) (upholding decision of planning review for land-use control). 
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their “fair share” of low- and moderate-income housing. Both of 
these popular programs run into major difficulties because the 
obligations in question, following on the tradition of Euclid, are 
imposed on developers and local communities without payment 
of just compensation. 
The standard view of an affordable housing program is that 
local and state governments require a developer to reserve a cer-
tain fraction of new housing for tenants or buyers who are mem-
bers of protected classes.129 The developer is allowed to offset the 
losses that come from these obligations by raising, to the extent 
that the market will allow, the rents or sale prices on the mar-
ket-rate units. In the United States, these programs are often 
defended as a way to offset the serious shortage of decent, safe, 
and sanitary housing for persons and families of low or moderate 
income given “an absolute present and future shortage of supply 
in relation to demand.”130 At no point do the defenders of these 
ordinances explain why supply and demand are perpetually out 
of equilibrium, for which the obvious answer is that the massive 
regulation of these housing markets—through a combination of 
zoning laws, rent-control ordinances, building codes, permit re-
strictions, disability-access rules, special permits, and taxes—
drives up the cost of low- and moderate-income housing.131 But 
instead of seeking to remove the obstacles that block market ac-
tivity, they impose restrictions on landlords and sellers that re-
sult in costly and often counterproductive behaviors.132 Unfortu-
nately, these systems are a clever form of price controls, for the 
 
 129. For my analysis of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unassail-
able Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION 
IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 64 (Lee Fennell & Benjamin Keys eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Afford-
able Housing Mandates]. 
 130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50003(a) (West 2018). The San Jose af-
fordable housing program, which “requires all new residential development pro-
jects of 20 or more units to sell at least 15 percent of the for-sale units at a price 
that is affordable to low or moderate income households,” was sustained against 
constitutional challenge on Euclid-like grounds in California Building Industry 
Ass’n v. City of San Jose. 351 P.3d 974, 978 (Cal. 2015). For my critique, see 
Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, supra 
note 129, at 65. 
 131. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Hous-
ing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997 (2010) (discussing the higher production 
costs of subsidized housing). 
 132. See Laura L. Westray, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause 
Eviction Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 323 (1988) (discussing the sys-
tematic risk that landlords will be deprived of their right to exclude, which is 
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limitations of price on some units necessarily limits the total rev-
enue that can be obtained from the entire production run, lead-
ing to chronic shortages. To make matters worse, the mandates 
for affordable housing often work badly because they require in-
teractions among different income groups that would not nor-
mally choose to live in the same project, even if they are quite 
happy to live in the same general neighborhood.133 These costs 
come from two sources. First, the need to rent or sell to two or 
three classes of occupants in a single building drives up the cost 
of construction by requiring different materials and layouts that 
must be spread uniformly throughout the project.134 It also 
drives up the cost of marketing by requiring separate and spe-
cialized brokerage staffs (common throughout all markets from 
land to cosmetics) to rent or sell separately to members of each 
group.135 And for the subsidized groups, potential tenants must 
be prescreened to determine eligibility for inclusion in the vari-
ous programs.136 On the demand side, the mixing of different in-
come groups tends to drive away wealthier clienteles who want 
extensive services and amenities (e.g. twenty-four-hour doorman 
service) that other occupants cannot afford.137 In some cases, de-
velopers have sought to beat back the force of these restrictions 
 
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly char-
acterized as property” (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982))). 
 133. See Naomi J. McCormick et al., The New Stigma of Relocated Public 
Housing Residents: Challenges to Social Identity in Mixed-Income Develop-
ments, 11 CITY & COMMUNITY 285, 289 (2012) (“The development of mixed-in-
come housing was an intentional effort to counteract public housing stigma, but 
produced countervailing forces.”); Jarred Schenke, Is HUD’s $6B Mixed-Income 
Housing Strategy to Blame for Housing Shortage, BISNOW (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/construction-development/huds 
-funding-faces-uncertainty-for-mixed-income-players-71491 (stating there is 
“little evidence that people with higher incomes mingle in any meaningful way 
with lower-income families in the same project”). 
 134. See ROBERT HICKEY, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, AFTER THE DOWNTURN: 
NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 9 (2013) 
(discussing the increase in costs of infill sites for inclusionary housing develop-
ments). 
 135. AARON GORNSTEIN & ANN VERRILLI, MIXED-INCOME HOUSING IN THE 
SUBURBS: LESSONS FROM MASSACHUSETTS 19 (2006) (discussing affirmative 
marketing requirements). 
 136. See, e.g., Mark Joseph & Robert Chaskin, Living in a Mixed-Income De-
velopment: Resident Perceptions of the Benefits and Disadvantages of Two De-
velopments in Chicago, 47 URB. STUD. 2347, 2357 (2010) (discussing the in-
creased screening of mixed-income developments). 
 137. See Patrick Bayer et al., Separate When Equal?: Racial Inequality and 
Residential Segregation 30 (Yale Working Papers on Econ. Applications & Pol-
icy, Discussion Paper No. 9, 2005), https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/ 
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by creating separate lobbies and elevators for the two groups.138 
But that in turn provokes a fierce legislative response against 
the “poor door,” which can easily derail the project in its en-
tirety.139 The correct way to handle this situation is for the state 
to compensate (in cash) the developer for the losses attributable 
to these multiple impositions, costs that are likely to prove so 
expensive that they will not be borne as the price is too high. A 
simpler scheme uses more efficient separation to provide low-in-
come persons with payments that allow them to receive subsi-
dized housing without disrupting the general practices, whose 
efficiency rationales regulators often fail to understand. 
The same difficulties arise with larger efforts to create bal-
anced communities outside of any single development. The most 
dramatic illustration of this practice comes from the endless lit-
igation in the Mount Laurel saga, beginning with the 1975 deci-
sion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.140 The court man-
aged to find a right to sufficient levels of low- and moderate-in-
come housing in a Blackstone-like constitutional provision that 
reads: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have 
certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those 
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining 
safety and happiness.”141 The intellectual transformation from a 
system of limited government to a comprehensive positive enti-
tlement to government financial support on a state-wide basis 
was made without any explanation. But that result differs mas-
sively from the single-owner paradigm used to organize land-use 
 
files/Working-Papers/wp000/ddp0009.pdf (“We motivated our hypothesis by 
documenting that middle-class black neighborhoods are in short supply given 
the current black sociodemographic structure in many U.S. metropolitan areas, 
forcing high-SES blacks either to live in predominantly white neighborhoods 
with high levels of neighborhood amenities or in more black neighborhoods with 
lower amenity levels.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Emily Badger, When Separate Doors for the Poor Are More 
than They Seem, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 31, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/31/when-the-poor-want-their 
-own-door (discussing the proposal for an apartment with different amenities 
for its “affordable units”). 
 139. See, e.g., S. 6012, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (amending housing 
and rent control law). 
 140. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). For one account of the decisions, see the New 
Jersey Digital Legal Library, which has collected many of the primary materi-
als. N.J. DIG. LEGAL LIBRARY, http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/mtlaurel/ 
aboutmtlaurel.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 141. N.J. CONST, art. I, § 1. 
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issues insofar as it requires that each unit of local government 
provide its fair share of low- and moderate-income housing.142 It 
is now over forty years since the New Jersey Supreme Court an-
nounced this basic fair-share obligation. Yet the imbroglio is still 
unresolved.143 It is critical to understand why. 
New Jersey, like many states, has authorized comprehen-
sive zoning codes that go far beyond the requirements of the law 
of nuisance and far beyond the requirements that are found in 
any PUD, all of which favor growth over redistribution.144 These 
government codes are often passed to advance the lofty goals of 
safe and balanced communities that hearken back to Euclid.145 
At this point, the first-best solution is to knock down the initial 
restrictive land-use regulation that blocked all low- and moder-
ate-income housing. On that view, developers could have con-
structed adequate housing projects located in places where their 
targeted customers wanted to live without creating any local 
nuisances. From this perspective, there would be no need for 
state subsidies, and there would be no need to adopt special rules 
for forcing these projects into particular communities under an 
ambitious statewide plan. But that ship has sailed. Now that the 
zoning laws are set in legal stone, local communities, acting in 
response to judicial pressure, have to concoct ad hoc exceptions 
to them.146 Since the notion of fair share cannot be operational-
ized, the basic scope of the obligation has to be determined for 
hundreds of separate communities, all of which have different 
 
 142. See, e.g., William W. Merrill III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and 
Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223, 229 (1993) (de-
scribing Florida’s Planning Act that requires local governments to plan for af-
fordable housing). 
 143. For round two of the litigation, see Southern Burlington County NAACP 
v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). For 
the arguments up through 1987, see John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: 
The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20 
(1987) (highlighting the problematic Mount Laurel decision and proposing a 
new approach to fair share). For a 2010 reprise, see generally MARCIA A. KAR-
ROW ET AL., HOUSING OPPORTUNITY TASK FORCE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (2010) (recommending changes to New Jersey’s affordable housing prac-
tices). 
 144. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:43-1.1 (2018) (“The purpose of the Neigh-
borhood Preservation Balanced Housing Program is to provide municipalities, 
for-profit and non-profit developers with financial assistance needed to spur the 
development of affordable housing across the State . . . .”). 
 145. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725–26 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
 146. See Banville v. Los Angeles, 4 Cal. Rptr. 458, 569 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1960) (discussing an ordinance providing the Regional Planning Commission 
the authority to grant a zoning exception). 
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population bases and different commercial and industrial activ-
ities.147 No ordinary mortal can discharge this Herculean task 
with any degree of certainty. But it is certain that local govern-
ments will use all the resources at their disposal to keep out low-
income families, often because of the additional tax burden that 
it will place on other landowners to fund the public education 
required for the influx of families with school-age children.148 It 
is impossible to describe in a short paper the vitriol and intrigue 
that has beset this program at every stage. But it is possible to 
note that these programs, like those for affordable housing man-
dates, all involve efforts to impose patterned principles—some 
externally desired end—on communities that are not consistent 
with the single-owner models developed here.149 Again, it is 
worth repeating that the situation would work far better if the 
government were authorized to use eminent domain power to 
purchase lands on which the various housing could be located. 
In that case, the state could organize a budget, and determine 
how to allocate it across communities. It could also exercise that 
power without local consent, and buy off the resistance of key 
landowners by offering full compensation. None of this was done. 
It is not therefore appropriate to dwell on the pathologies that 
were built into the program as early as 1975, as such defects can 
never be removed. The limits of coercion, the dangers of faction, 
and the want of coherent knowledge all doomed the plan to fail-
ure. 
  CONCLUSION   
The purpose of this paper is to offer a conceptual explana-
tion of how to make sound land-use development decisions in the 
face of the pervasive positive and negative externalities caused 
by all human actions. The key move is to start with a universe 
in which no externalities are possible, namely those in which all 
persons take either directly or by way of succession from a single 
owner who has the proper incentives to internalize all gains and 
losses from future productive activity. The gains that are given 
to one person generate the prospect of additional revenues, but 
 
 147. See Payne, supra note 143, at 26 (describing the complexity of the pro-
posed fair-share formulas). 
 148. Cf. GORNSTEIN & VERRILLI, supra note 135, at 7 (discussing the in-
crease in families with school-aged children in communities with reputable 
school systems). 
 149. For the notable critique of patterned principles, see ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149–231 (1974). 
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the correlative losses generate offsetting revenue losses. All de-
cisions therefore involve the correct form of netting out gains and 
losses so that the socially optimum result is obtainable whenever 
the single owner maximizes that gain. 
In dealing with these issues, one discovers, both in theory 
and in practice, that the control of nuisance-like activities gen-
erates a more or less uniform set of responses that serve as a 
template to set boundary arrangements between two or more 
parties that do not derive their ownership rights from a common 
source. Hence the law of trespass and nuisance turns out to be 
relatively easy to impose and, in general, can be made to work 
well. But the set of positive benefits from gainful interactions 
varies widely across different projects, especially given the mix 
of parties who buy into the scheme, so that it is far harder to 
generate a set of rules for paying restitution for unrequested 
benefits between strangers. The effort to use private-law reme-
dies generally fails because the benefits are too numerous and 
ill-defined. Sometimes a legal regulation might work, although 
there is risk of overregulation. Often social pressures may be the 
best system for dealing with these lost opportunities. 
What is clear, however, is that any system of public law 
magnifies the risks of major economic dislocations. The private 
logic of the single owner does not afford any support for efforts 
to create extensive zoning schemes that not only separate parties 
but also specify particular uses for particular locations, or which 
require extensive cross-subsidies for affordable or fair-housing 
programs. Often these goals are unattainable, even if the state 
offers compensation for the parties whose property is taken for 
some allegedly larger social objective. It is therefore necessary to 
learn once again the limits of law in solving all social problems. 
A system of decentralized property rights controls most of the 
negative externalities. A system of private regulation can cap-
ture most of the positive externalities. It is always necessary to 
remind ourselves that the effort to push legal controls into un-
charted territories often does more harm than good. 
